TABLE 7. Calibration of the labour market
| Home | REA | US | RW |
|---|
| Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply ζ | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
|---|
| Matching probability, Ricardian workers, (piW) | 0.3021 | 0.2238 | 0.5292 | 0.3442 |
|---|
| Matching probability, HtM workers, (pjW) | 0.2090 | 0.1848 | 0.5385 | 0.2598 |
|---|
| Matching probability, firms, (psF) | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.70 | 0.70 |
|---|
| Matching efficiency, Ric. w., (φi,M) | 0.4598 | 0.3958 | 0.6086 | 0.4908 |
|---|
| Matching efficiency, HtM w., (φj,M) | 0.3825 | 0.3596 | 0.6139 | 0.4264 |
|---|
| Vac. posting cost, Ric. w., (Ψi) | 0.6984 | 0.3336 | 0.3126 | 0.3715 |
|---|
| Vac. posting cost, HtM w., (Ψj) | 0.2373 | 0.1953 | 0.1384 | 0.2630 |
|---|
| Break-up rate, Ric. w., (δx,i) | 0.0140 | 0.0226 | 0.0271 | 0.0221 |
|---|
| Break-up rate, HtM w., (δx,j) | 0.0339 | 0.0276 | 0.0516 | 0.0259 |
|---|
| Disutility of labour, Ric. w., (χi) | 1.0270 | 0.6101 | 0.5838 | 0.6677 |
|---|
| Disutility of labour, HtM w., (χj) | 1.2732 | 1.3434 | 1.3845 | 1.2745 |
|---|
| Matching elasticity, Ric. w., (μi) | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
|---|
| Matching elasticity, HtM w., (μj) | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
|---|
| Bargaining power η | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
|---|
| Replacement ratio, Ric. w., (rrati) | 0.470 | 0.525 | 0.463 | 0.495 |
|---|
| Replacement ratio, HtM w., (rratj) | 0.597 | 0.551 | 0.542 | 0.542 |
|---|
| Unemployment rate, (un) | 0.0696 | 0.1038 | 0.0605 | 0.0694 |
|---|
| Unemployment rate, HtM w., (unj) | 0.1437 | 0.1334 | 0.0918 | 0.0930 |
|---|
| Prob. to renegotiate existing wage, Ric. w., (ξw,i) | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 |
|---|
| Prob. to renegotiate existing wage, HtM w., (ξw,j) | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 |
|---|
| Prob. to start job at avg. wage, Ric. w., (κw,i) | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 |
|---|
| Prob. to start job at avg. wage, HtM w., (κw,j) | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 | 0.8879 |
|---|
To analyse the effects of delays in the delivery of public investment, we simulate a gradual, but permanent debt-financed increase in public investment. To clearly separate the effects of different types of delays, we simulate the increase in public investment without any delays, and then compare this with 2- and 5-year planning delays (time-to-plan). We then repeat the same simulation, but with 2- and 5-year construction delays (time-to-build).12 We conduct the same set of simulations across two models, first in the model without search frictions on the labour market, and second in the otherwise identical model, except that this time the standard labour market is replaced by search frictions.13
It is important to clarify in detail the information structure of the experiments conducted. Before the announcement, the economy is in the steady state, and the