5e4b89f2-e16f-4af5-a3f1-d1bf144ca3bb_example-pdf__1_-artifacted.pdf — PaddleOCR-VL (Baidu)

The literature review found a few papers that look at the econometrics of shipper savings through the use of a UCC, but none that explored the break-even point of a CUCC. The issue of enforcement was not found in the review; however, this may be due to the scope delimiting.

Exploring the full range of urban freight concepts and practice from the 1970s through COST321, OECD, and multiple thematic and knowledge networks such as BESTUFS, the Institute of City Logistics, BESTFACT, and CIVITAS, it is clear that most UCC initiatives fail in a liberal economy where free choice and market economics apply without levels of subsidy unacceptable to public and private bodies over time [54,55].

Many of these UCCs have been successful in understanding urban freight logistics, trialling clean urban vehicles, testing the limits of co-operation in a free market, and indeed understanding why they are non-viable.

Given that COST321 [56] (and then subsequent networks and projects) identified a wide range of urban freight logistics interventions apart from or in parallel to UCCs, it is noticeable that they have been somewhat neglected in comparison, and that, as COST321 suggested, several other interventions may yield more advantageous results.

On the other hand, the theoretical goal of reducing last mile congestion in urban cities through focused scheduling and bundling of flows into sites and locations still holds, and there are 3 types of UCC that could be implemented with the degree of compulsion required to overcome the drivers of free markets. In all cases, the mandate for compulsion lies in the hands of public and private actors. The 3 site types are:

Secure controlled sites: where the controller of that site wishes to reduce traffic flows for reasons of security, safety, reduced intrusion, or corporate social responsibility AND has the budget and mandate to pay for the inevitable on-cost and/or service level reduction.
Examples: Government buildings, transport hubs, military bases, and small polities outside of free market principles.
In most cases, the mandate and power already exist, are unlikely to be affected by budgetary concerns, and can be enacted with no challenge.
In effect, the ‘front door’ is moved to the CC.
Construction sites are under the control of a developer who has been required to mitigate traffic impacts through better vehicle utilisation by a planning body that has made it a condition of the development being approved.
Examples that are known are Hammarsby Sjostad and Potsdamer Platz, and it is known that TfL requires developers to demonstrate where consolidation can take place on a construction site within Construction Logistics Plans.
In the UK, it is likely that planning authorities already hold this power either in fact or through negotiation.
Purchasing departments require improved utilisation of vehicles to reduce the impacts of inbound logistics on organisations, either through the operation of a UCC or through a requirement on suppliers to prove optimised utilisation on inbound logistics flows.
This is potentially powerful and could be achieved through the controls in place for any procurement that involves substantial amounts of public funds, either to or through public and some private bodies (e.g., Universities).
However, this would require to be placed high enough in the wide range of requirements made on purchasing professionals from national and local governments, and the primary issue is that cost reduction usually trumps all other concerns.

The review has shown that there are very few successful compulsory consolidation centres in the world. These can be divided into those that have an entirely controlled territory, those that use procurement-based control of inbound logistics, or direct legal regulation [53,57–59].